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1. INTRODUCTION 
This research aims to shed light on economic significance of stock reactions to large price changes and answer 
the question as if ordinary investors can earn economic profits after large stock price increase/decrease by 
studying 10 portfolios comprised of the most and the lease liquid stocks (basing on stocks’ average trading 
volumes) from 5 major Asian markets, namely mainland China, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Numerous finance researches attribute “shocks” or “black swan” events to investors’ overreaction. De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) conjecture that abnormal movements in stock prices will be followed by corresponding price 
movements in the opposite direction and more significant the initial price movements, the greater will be the 
corresponding adjustment afterward. They conclude that such phenomenon is not consistent with EMH. 
Bremer and Sweeney (1991), Bremer, Hiraki and Sweeney (1997), Bowman and Iverson (1998) all suggest 
that price behaves differently to what the EMH suggested. On the other side, Atkins and Dyl (1990) conclude 
that price movements after “shocks” is in favour of EMH after accounting for bid-ask bounce and liquidity 
despite overreaction in U.S daily stock prices being well documented. Their findings echo Lasfer et al. (2003), 
who find support for return continuations in stock indexes and authors attribute that phenomenon to momentum 
behaviour in returns. Brown et al. (1998) argue that Uncertain Information Hypothesis (UIH) offers a better 
explanation of short-term price movements. Cox and Peterson (1994) studied on NYSE stocks and found 
inconsistent behaviour of prices following large price declines from one sub-sample period to another. More 
important, they conjectured an inverse relationship between general liquidity in security markets and returns. 
While developed economies struggling with recessions, emerging markets in Asia have shown significant 
resilience and signs of strong economic recovery. This phenomenon attracts proliferate foreign capitals flowing 
into those markets. Since Investing in Asia is the “headline” in the financial world at the moment, a study that 
solely emphasises on 5 major Asian stock markets provides useful information to those who are interested in 
investment opportunities in Asia. China and Japan are two of the largest economy in the world. Technology 
sector is the investors’ favourite pick under the current circumstance, NASDAQ by far outperformed DJIA. 
Korea and Taiwan as being leaders of technology innovations are the investment “hot spots”. 5 markets that 
are studied in this paper share many similarities as far as structure of the trading mechanism concerns. The 
results of those 5 markets then can be compared on the same ground. Contrary to American exchanges, the 5 
markets being used in this study are essentially a single price, two-way, transaction-based continuous auction 
market with special procedures designed to suppress fast and large price changes. (Bremer, 1997). There are 
no designated market makers (they cannot make a market using their own account, as NYSE specialists do), 
but there are exchange officials who match orders between the buyers and sellers to process single price 
transactions. Therefore, there are no competitive bid and ask prices among market makers. In addition, because 
of those structural differences, findings that have been documented in those studies focusing on American 
stocks may not be the case for Asian stocks. 
Consider the following naïve trading strategy. Buy (sell short) an amount of any Shanghai Composite stock 
that had a 5% or greater decrease (increase) on the day of the price change at the closing price. What is the 
profit after commissions and securities transactions taxes from such a strategy for retail investors? What is the 
profit for members of exchanges who normal pay no commissions at all? The round trip commission that apply 
for most of the period examined in this study are large and not negotiable. It ranges from 3.5% (KOSPI) of the 
stocks’ value on the smallest transaction to 0.3%(NIKKI) for the largest transaction (Bremer, 1997). There is 
also a securities transaction tax (it’s being called different names though, in China, such tax is named stamp 
tax). Bremer et al (1997) found that 67% of cumulative abnormal returns after large price declines are positive 
suggesting a profit opportunity for firm brokers/deals as well as retail investors capable of making large 
transactions; but on closer examination, they concluded that profits after being adjusted by systematic risks are 
not likely. Ten (10) portfolios that are studied in this paper showed clear evidence of price continuation after 
large price increases and a mixed picture of how stocks behave following large price decreases. Statistically 
significant post-event mean daily return indicates that both bid-ask spread and liquidity are not sufficient to 
explain either price reversal or continuation observed in this study. In addition, the duration of the price pattern 
hints that traders or naïve investors might profit from large price changes. On other side, the size of price 
pattern may reduce the profit making opportunities for retail investors after considering transaction costs, bid-
ask spreads and other surcharges. Finally, the result shows that big-cap portfolios performed better following 
the price increases whereas small-portfolios tend to be superior after large price drops. But such differences 
are not statistically significant, meaning that the firm’s size does not matter.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since 1980s, numerous researches that studied stock returns showed rich empirical evidences suggesting the 
failure of ever-so popular asset pricing models. During that time, several empirical puzzles had been 
extensively studied. Keim and Stambaugh (1985), French (1980) identified the day of the week effect and 
weekend effects on stock returns. Banz (1981) Reinganum (1983) proposed a size effect. Third well-known 
puzzle of stock returns pattern is the reversal of large-price increases/decreases. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) 
were recognized as the first work of providing compelling evidence of long-run overreaction. However, 
numerous studies investigated possible weakness of De Bondt and Thaler(1985)’s hypothesis, i.e. Conrad and 
Kaul (1993). Despite the divergences on possible causes for long-run reversal phenomenon, short-term return 
reversal seems being consistently attributed to over-reaction.  
Bremer and Sweeney (1991) studied the stock returns of all firms that are included in the Fortune 500 from 
1962 to 1986. The result showed statistically significant abnormal returns of which the trading days follows an 
extremely large negative price change. They then went on to conclude that such price reactions are not in line 
with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Brown, Harlow and Tinic (BHT) (1988) inferred that price movements 
in response to either good or bad news should be positive on average. Bowman and Iverson (1998) found 
support for the over-reaction hypothesis after studying stock prices in New Zealand following a large weekly 
change in price.  The authors inferred that the stock market does over-react, especially when a large price 
decline occurs. They attributed reversal phenomenon to risk, size, seasonal and bid-ask spread. Laser et al 
(2003), however, provided the evidence that is not consistent with over-reaction hypothesis. The work echoes 
Cox and Peterson (1994) supporting the short-term under-reaction hypothesis as well as momentum behavior 
in returns. Laser et al (2003) might be the first work factoring in “economic divergence” when studying stock 
indexes’ reactions to large price changes. They found differences across the 2 types of markets: the degree of 
the large price changes is more significant in developing markets than in OECD markets. Zhang (2006) 
investigated the impact of information uncertainty on price continuation anomalies and cross-sectional 
variations in stock returns. Zhang (2006) evidence supported UIH. Brown et al. (1988), Ajayi et al. (2006) all 
found evidence supporting UIH. 
Veronesi (1999) found the evidence that the magnitude of market over-reactions is correlated with market 
conditions based on the fact that the equilibrium price function increase and convex in investors’ posterior 
probability of the high state which is due to the extra discount investors seek in anticipation of the higher 
volatility of returns that occur when they are more uncertain about the true state of the world. Mazouz, Joseph 
and Palliere (2009) examined the short-term price behavior of 10 Asian market indexes following large price 
changes. Their result showed a substantial variation in the impacts of large price changes in markets that are 
investigated indicating that the price reactions to “shocks” are vary by countries.  Atkins and Dly (1990) used 
daily returns for all NYSE stocks from Jan 1975 through Dec 1984 and argued that the price of a share will 
decrease (increase) during a trading day if more traders sell (buy) that stock. On average, such phenomenon 
could give the occurrence of the observed price reversals. Bowman and Iverson (1998) suggested that Atkins 
and Dly (1990)’s work provides some support for the bid-ask bounce explanation of the return reversals. 
Earlier works on study reversal phenomenon failed to recognize the role of bid-ask spread when evaluating the 
economic significant of price reversal. Despite many investors, i.e floor traders and members of stock 
exchanges, not being subject to any normal brokerage fees, bid-ask bounce is still able to affect traders’ ability 
to benefit financially from predictable changes in stock changes. Work of Stoll and Whaley (1983) argued that 
the existence of bid-ask spread is crucial in determining the possibility of earning abnormal returns by 
exploiting market anomalies. Accounting for bid-ask bounce is also of interest in the light of work by Keim 
(1989), who inferred that systematic shifts from trading at one end to another might proportionally explain 
temporal stock return patterns, i.e. the day of the week effect, the turn of the month effect, etc. A similar shift 
might also partially account for the over-reaction that is observed in the stock market. Atkins and Dyl (1990) 
found that stock prices do over-react in the short-run, especially in response to negative information; but that 
significance of over-reactions, despite being statistically significant, is negligible compared to bid-ask spread 
observed in the stock markets. Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) found that bid-ask bounce might be the cause of 
the apparent price reversals in the daily data for NASDAQ companies. They found no evidence of over-reaction 
after controlling for the bid-ask bounce. In addition, the authors documented strong positive correlations 
between market capitalization, stock price and trading volume; which are all negatively linked with the bid-
ask spread. Ball et al. (1995) argued that bid-ask spread accounts about two thirds of the following-week profits 
from a contrarian strategy. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) echoed Ball et al. conclusion. On other side Park 
(1995) concluded that bid-ask spread does not fully explain price reversals that have seen in US stocks. 
Contrary to a common held view that short-term over-reaction and long-term reversal in returns are integrated, 
George and Hwang (2004) found that momentum is mainly caused by the “anchor and adjust” bias where 
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momentum and reversals are separate phenomenon. As the nature of an anchor-and adjust bias being more 
tractable to describe investor behavior than its peers, the authors believed that investors do not over react when 
they adjust for an anchor.  Du (2008), however, challenged the finding of George and Hwang (2004) that 
despite an anchor-and-adjust bias being a better description of investors behavior, they do over-react when they 
adjusting and international momentum strategies are worth to explore  even after taking into accounts of risk 
and transaction-cost adjustments. 
3. DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this study, 10 portfolios are constructed basing on the market capitalization: each market that is studied in 
this research has 2 portfolios, namely Portfolio Big Cap and Portfolio Small Cap and each portfolio contains 
20 stocks that ranked the highest in that category. The close to close prices of stocks of 5 Asian markets being 
studied in this research were retrieved by DataStream Advance 4.0. Information regarding market capitalization 
and trading volumes are obtained from Finance Yahoo and Thompson One Banker.  The sample period is 
ranged from January 2004 to December 2017. 5 market indices are SSC, TOPIX, TAIEX, Hang Seng and 
KOSPI. Bremer et al (1997) stated that by studying stocks from large stock markets one can effectively avoided 
missing observations and potential measurement errors, as stocks are more actively traded and stock exchanges 
check recorded prices more thoroughly. 
 
Following Bremer et al (1997), stock returns used in this research are not dividend-adjusted.  The effect of 
missing dividend on abnormal returns would not cause any concern since ex dividend days for those stocks are 
concentrated on 2 calendar days, which are the last trading day of the semi-annual fiscal period in March and 
September. Results in Bremer et al (1997) showed that roughly 17% of large price changes happened around 
the end of fiscal periods.  
 
This study uses same way that was used in Atkins and Dyl (1990), Cox and Peterson (1994), and Bremer et al 
(1997) to identify events or “shocks”.  An event day (shock) is identified according to magnitude of raw rates 
of returns on indexes. Consider all daily rates of returns of 5 market indexes that are included in this study that 
were greater than or equal to 3% or less than or equal to -3% during 1st Sep 2004 and 31st Aug 2009; name 
those rates of returns as “shocks” or large price changes. According to Bremer et al. (1997), “shocks” are 
existed from surprise new information which eventually affecting the value of stocks. For this study, surprise 
information is likely to be monetary policies; fiscal policies; political issues; forex …etc. According to Atkins 
and Dly (1990), “shocks” create opportunities to assess if markets preciously price surprise new information 
or over/under react to them. For positive price shocks during the sample interval, this study uses trigger value 
Tv+ as follows: +3%< Tv+ <+5%; +5%< Tv+<+10%; and Tv+≥+10%. Similarly, for negative price changes 
during the sample period, this study uses trigger value Tv- as follows: -3%> Tv- >-5%; -5%> Tv->-10%; and 
Tv-≤-10%. Despite statistically significant abnormal returns following large one-day returns being 
academically intriguing, it is also important to make sure that such phenomenon is worth exploiting from a 
standpoint of practice finance, meaning that it must be able to offer material yields after considering all costs 
incurred. 
           Table 1. Frequency of Positive and Negative Shocks from January 2004 to December 2017 
Country Frequency of positive shocks for various trigger values   
 Total 
Obs. +3%<St<+5% St≥5% -5%<St<-3% St≤-5%     
China 1304 54 12 55 22     
Japan 1304 23 6 28 11     
Hong Kong 1304 39 20 45 17     
Taiwan 1304 17 7 46 4     
Korea 1304 23 8 29 10     
Table 1 shows the frequency of positive and negative price shocks of different magnitudes. The slight greater 
occurrence of negative shocks, perhaps reflects the period of high market volatility following the financial 
crisis that rocked the entire financial system world-wide.   As expected, smaller positive and negative price 
shocks are more frequent than larger positive and negative shocks. For price shocks within the range of 3% to 
5%, China has the most price shocks and Taiwan has the fewest. Hongkong has 20 5% plus price shocks, which 
is the most in the sample whereas Taiwan only has 7. For price declines with the range of -3% to -5%, China 
once again has the most price shocks with 55 events and Japan has the fewest with 28 times. 22 5% or worse 
price drops happened in China during Sep 1st 2004 to Aug 31th 2009, which is the most and only 4 happened 
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in Taiwan during same period. Cumulative abnormal returns for each stock are calculated by adding the 
individual day abnormal returns. Panel A in which average returns, market model intercepts and market model 
slopes corresponds to the price rise between 3% to 5% by countries are presented shows that the Hong Kong 
has the lowest event day market return, setting at 3.658%, Japan has the highest event day market return of 
3.795% whereas other 3 markets’ returns fall between returns for the Hong Kong and Japan. Interestingly, 
Hong Kong and Japan are only 2 countries where display price reversals following one-day price rise between 
3% and 5%. On other hand, Taiwan has the strongest price continuation following the initial price rise where 
day 1-3 mean daily market return is 0.42%.  
 
Day 0 returns of the portfolios show a very similar picture relative to market returns. Japan and China all have 
over 4% returns. Towards the lower end, the return of Hong Kong was 3.24%. Matched pair t-statistics are 
used to compare the differences of mean daily return, market model alpha and market model beta around the 
“initial event period”. Unsurprisingly, post-event mean daily return of both big and small cap portfolios of 
Japan are significantly larger than that of pre-event period as the t-statistics sitting at -3.55 and -4.02 
respectively. Big-cap portfolio of China is the only portfolio didn’t display the price continuation during the 
post-event period as its matched pair t-statistic is statistically insignificant at 10% level. The significance of 
market model alphas tell use if a large price changes signal the beginning of a prolonged period of “change of 
course” performance compared to the past. The t-statistic of post-event market model alpha for Hong Kong 
big-cap is statistically significant at 95% level sitting at -2.35, which suggests that a sharp price drop may 
signal the beginning of a prolonged period of “sub-par” performance relative to its past track record. The 
economic significance of changes in average betas from pre-event to post-event period is immaterial according 
to Cox and Peterson (1994). The results show that on average, market model intercepts and market model 
slopes corresponds to the price rise of 5% or more by countries. The results show that Hong Kong has the 
highest event day market return, sitting at 8.361%, Taiwan has the lowest event day market return of 5.817% 
whereas other 3 markets’ returns fall between returns for Hong Kong and Taiwan. Japanese market doesn’t 
exhibit the price reversal following a one day price rise of 5% or more whereas China and Hong Kong have 
negative day 1-3 mean daily market return. Both Japan’s big and small-cap portfolios are the best performer in 
their categories, which former has a return of 9.44% whilst latter offers 8.34%. Post-event mean daily return 
of Japan’s big-cap portfolio is 0.19% with a t-statistic of -6.95.On the lower end, China and Taiwan’s big and 
small-cap portfolios failed to deliver the return that is statistically better than those of the pre-event periods. 
The t-statistic of post-event market model alpha for Japan big and small-cap is statistically significant at 99% 
level sitting at -38.14 and-22.92 respectively, which suggests that a sharp price drop is very likely to signal the 
beginning of a prolonged period of “sub-par” performance relative to its past track record.  
 
In addition, the results also show that on average, market model intercepts and market model slopes 
corresponds to the price decline between 3% to 5% by countries and China has the lowest event day market 
return, setting at -3.882%. Korean has the highest event day market return of -3.648% whereas other 3 markets’ 
returns fall between returns for the China and Korean. Taiwan is the only country that does not exhibit price 
reversals following one-day price drop between 3% and 5%. On other hand, Korean has the strongest price 
continuation following the initial price decline where day 1-3 mean daily market return is 0.526%. China’s big-
cap portfolio is the biggest causality following the one day price decline of 3%-5% as it’s day 0 return is -
4.24%; both big and small-cap portfolio of Korean are the stellar performers on the day where the market 
plummeted between 3-5% with a event day return of -3.5% and -1.63% respectively. 4 out of 5 countries big-
cap portfolios showed a statistically better post-event return relative to those of pre-event, Japan’s return is 
statistically better than that of pre-event period at 99% level. For large-cap portfolios, towards the lower end 
the return of Korean big-cap was -8.09% and return of Japan was -7.94%; on the higher end, Taiwan’s big-cap 
produced the best return of -5.88%, which was followed by China big-cap’s return of -6.82%.For small-cap 
portfolios, Taiwan’s small cap produced the best result of -4.32% when facing market headwinds. Korean’s 
small-cap performed much better than its big-cap, sitting at -4.42%, which is the second best perform in the 
group. On the lower end, Japan small-caps return is -7.58%, which is the worst return in the group. 2 portfolios 
of China failed to delivery statistically meaningful post-event mean daily return comparing to those of pre-
event period whilst returns of 2 portfolios of Japan were all statistically superior relative to past at 99% level. 
 
Contrary to finding of Cox and Perterson(1994), our result shows a mixed picture of portfolios’ performance 
over 21th to120th trading days following the initial event. All portfolios showed statistically meaningful price 
continuation following price rise within 3% to 5% except 2 from China. However, portfolios’ performance 
following price increase of 5% or more were “sub-due” somewhat. 4 portfolios from China and Taiwan showed 
no sign of price continuation during post-event period. Japan as being the only emerged market in the sample 
displayed the strongest price continuation in both case. As far as Price declines concern, convincing evidence 
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of price reversal during post-event periods is observed. Large-cap portfolios performed slightly better following 
the price decline of 3% to 5% during the post-event period judging by t-statistics whereas small-cap portfolios 
displayed a better resistance corresponding to large price declines. As being the largest emerging market in the 
world, portfolios of China didn’t show price continuation following price rises, nor did it show price reversal 
after price drops whilst portfolios of Japan made the strongest cases in supporting both price reversal and price 
continuation phenomenon. 
 
The results on average abnormal returns for each portfolio following large price changes during initial event 
periods show that the average abnormal returns for each portfolio following positive shocks are within the 
range of 3% to 5%. All 10 portfolios showed positive returns following the initial price increase during day 1 
to day 3, of which both big-cap and small-cap portfolios of china shown statistically significant price 
continuations during period of day 1-3. 3 portfolios prices moved in the opposite direction during day 4 to day 
20; but only Hong Kong small-cap portfolio’s price reversal is statistically meaningful at the 90% level. 
Consistent with the result showing during first 3 days after the initial price change, the big-cap and small-cap 
portfolios of China show strong price continuation judging by the t-statistics. Overall, 3 small-cap portfolios 
showed stronger price continuations during day 1 to day 3 whilst Big-cap portfolios performed better from day 
4 to day 20. 7 portfolios showed positive returns following the initial price increase during day 1 to day 3, of 
which only small-cap portfolio of Korea shown statistically significant price continuations during period of 
day 1-3 whereas small-cap of China, small and big cap portfolios of Japan exhibited price reversal to the extend 
which t-statistics are insignificant. 5 portfolios prices moved in the opposite direction during day 4 to day 20; 
but 2 small-cap portfolio’s price reversal is statistically meaningful at the 90% level. Overall, occurrence of 
statistically price reversal increased as the initial price change goes up. Panel C displays the average ARs for 
both big and small cap portfolios following the initial price declines of 3% to 5%. Big cap portfolio of China 
showed the most significant price reversal during 1-3 days as well as 4-20 days. Big cap Japan is only other 
portfolio that displayed statistically meaningful price reversal during day 4 to day 20 after the initial price 
“shocks”.  There were more portfolios displaying price reversals during day 1 to day 3 than day 4 to day 20 
and all portfolios displaying price reversals during day 4 to day 20 were big cap portfolios.  
 
Consistent with results above, both big and small capitalization portfolios from China showed strong price 
reversals from day 4 to day 20 despite returns of day 1 to day 3 being statistically insignificant. Only small cap 
portfolios exhibited price continuations that offer profit opportunities during day 1 to day 3 whilst only big cap 
portfolios showed meaningful price continuations judging by t-statistics. The price continuation is confirmed 
by cumulative abnormal returns of portfolios once again. Only 2 small-cap portfolios exhibited price reversal 
but can be neglected judging by t-statistics. Panel B shows portfolios cumulative ARs after price rises of 5 
percent or more, in which 2 portfolios of China made the a strong case for price continuations whereas Taiwan 
big-cap and Korean small-cap exhibit statistically meaningful price reversals. All in all larger positive trigger 
value provides more convincing support for price continuation following price increases and small-cap 
portfolios tend to offer higher returns relative to big-cap portfolios. Panel C presents CARs of portfolios 
following price drops within the range between -3% and -5%, only bid-cap Hong Kong displayed a statistically 
meaningful price continuation.  More price continuations are observed in panel D, where display CARs of 
portfolios after price drops of 5 percent or worst. However, only 2 price continuations are statistically 
significant. All in all, small-cap portfolios showed better resistance corresponding to large price drops. This 
study follows Cox and Peterson (1994), using the pre-event mean daily return as the benchmark to study any 
possible price continuation or reversal beyond day 20. Post-event mean daily returns of portfolios being 
statistically significant signal the start of an extended period of price continuations following large price 
changes and price reversals after large price drops. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper sheds lights on reactions to large price changes in 5 major East Asian countries.  The result of ex-
post returns of 20 trading days after the “initial event” shows a clear evidence of price continuation after large 
price increases, which is consistent with Lasfer et al (2003), Bowman and Iverson (1998); and a mixed evidence 
of price reversal following large price declines, which echoes Ajayi et al (2006) and Veronesi (1999). In 
addition, evidences shown in the study are contrary to Cox and Peterson (1994) that bid-ask spread and liquidity 
are not sufficient to explain neither price reversals nor price continuations. Portfolios of China performed the 
best during the “initial event period”. The duration as well as the magnitude of the price pattern observed in 
this paper hint that traders, or even naïve investors may be benefit from large price changes; institutional 
investors (who are not subject to trading sur-charges) are more likely to capitalize on opportunities that  
manifested themselves following large price movements. As far as stocks performance beyond “event 
windows” period (from 21st trading days onwards) is concerned, this research is consistent with Cox and 
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Peterson (1994) confirming markets prone to enter an extended period of relatively good performance where 
price continuations / reverse is itself continued after a “initial event period”. Portfolios comprised of Japanese 
stocks are the most superior over the extended periods (from 21st trading day to 120th trading days). However, 
results of price continuations/ reversal over longer periods can vary depending on the method used, which 
warrants further examinations. Small-cap portfolios in chosen East Asia countries performed better following 
larger or negative price changes. But in general, the influence of size effect is neglect in this study, which also 
warrants further studies. An important point that needs to be mentioned when comparing results stated in this 
paper to those done on European and/or American stocks is that trading mechanism in Asia is different from 
elsewhere. Most of Asia capital markets do not use market makers, hence there is no competitive bid-ask 
spreads. According to Bremer (1997), Asia markets’ high, fixed commissions may motivate dealers/brokers 
providing liquidity on days when stock prices plunged without requiring any compensation. Such behaviors 
may partially contribute to some findings of this research. 
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